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Consolidation, Coordination,
Competition, and Coherence: In
Search of a Forward Looking
Communications Policy
Mark D. Director*
Michael Botein**
Coherent national communications policy making has increasingly
eluded us. Missteps and false steps have impeded progress. The courts, the
Congress, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) have clashed regularly. The result has been a lack of
direction, as the involved factions attempt to cope with new technology's
unfulfilled promises.
The challenge for policymakers is to pursue coherent policies in an
intellectually honest manner. It is an awesome task to reweave the frayed
fibers of social policy, economic reality, and constitutional constraint; but,
this is necessary to achieve a strong national communications policy.
Legislative and regulatory initiatives are valuable in some situations.
For the foreseeable future, however, it will be more important to examine
and define fundamental goals rigorously. The sixty-year-old Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (Communications Act or Act) has survived largely intact,
and it may be able to endure well into the future. In fact, the Act's least
enduring parts are likely to be the more recent additions-the 1984 and the
1992 Cable Acts. The latter already supplants much of the former, but both
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the First and Fifth Amendments loom as potential threats to major portions
of the latter.
Enduring policies should be based on considerations beyond current
events. For example, the recent rash of proposed mega-mergers is not the
building block for long-term policies. Thankfully, Congress did not rewrite
the Communications Act as a kneejerk reaction to potential mergers
between the Baby Bells and cable multisystem operators-a "trend" that
may have evaporated before it even really emerged. This may serve as a
lesson about the potential folly of purely reactive legislation in the
communications sector. To seek a more enlightened future course, we
should begin by assessing the policy disarray that has been created.
In the common carrier arena, evolution is stalled. Reviewing courts
have rejected a number of the Commission's attempts to adopt important
new policies, most recently concluding that the Commission lacked
statutory power to exclude nondominant carriers from filing tariffs.'
Combined with lengthy delays in implementing other significant new rules
and policies (including, for example, approval of video dialtone applica-
tions), such developments have left the common carrier sector without any
clear policy direction and with uncertainty about the scope of the agency's
jurisdiction to regulate changing markets. Broadcasters also have received
little policy guidance. Constitutional and policy disagreements about
sexually explicit and violent broadcasting have plagued the industry and
have consumed an inordinate amount of administrative resources. At the
same time, efforts to improve children's programming and to assess other
content-related policies have floundered amid a vigorous battle of advocates
and major questions about whether (or when) the First Amendment boom
will be lowered on the Commission's and Congress's restrictions on
broadcasters.
Judicial attacks on the comparative hearing process have added
uncertainty to the traditional licensing scheme.2 Although the FCC has
continued to relax ownership rules, it has grappled continually with the
tension between its commitment to ownership diversity and its desire to
promote broadcasters' potential economies of scale through duopolies and
multiple ownership. Finally, the networks still confront a confounding
1. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
2. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (vacating and remanding an FCC
comparative licensing decision with instructions for the agency to consider the applications
without regard to its policies favoring the integration of ownership and management); see
also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (vacating and remanding an earlier
decision in the same case).
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future. Legal and economic questions breed hesitancy about possible
multimedia growth strategies.3
Cable television still labors under probably the most complex and
least comprehensible communications policy regime. It is hard to predict
future policy developments for an industry which has endured countless
policy changes in the four decades of its existence. To confound matters
further, the Supreme Court's rather obtuse decision in the recent Turner
Broadcasting case is open to at least two contradictory interpretations.
One portion of the Court's opinion suggests that at least some regulatory
restrictions on cable television, which would not be permitted if imposed
on print media, will be permitted-despite the First Amendment-because
of cable's perceived role as a "gatekeeper."5 The open question is how
broadly a relaxed level of First Amendment scrutiny will be applied. If it
were applied as a broad "exception" to cable's general status as a protected
First Amendment speaker, the rationale would uphold the FCC's regulatory
thrusts under the 1992 Cable Act. Alternatively, a narrow interpretation of
this "exception" would allow regulation only where a regulation directly
addresses cable's "gatekeeper" functions-as in the case of the must-carry
or third-party access rules. This would subject much (if not most) cable
regulation to heightened scrutiny under cable's newly affirmed status as a
protected First Amendment speaker. Under the latter interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision, courts could invoke the First Amendment to
amputate substantial portions of the 1992 Cable Act, thereby restoring the
industry to its prior less-regulated status-most recently during the second
half of the 1980s. The FCC will have to be reactive, rather than proactive,
until the true meaning of the majority opinion in Turner Broadcasting
emerges.
Finally, a variety of still-emerging media have contributed little more
than a set of additional acronyms-e.g., DBS (direct broadcast satellite),
MMDS (multichannel multipoint distribution service), ADSL (asymmetric
3. E.g., In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 FCC Rcd.
3282, reconsideration granted in part, 8 FCC Rcd. 8270 (1993), affd sub nom. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994) (resulting in the relaxation of the
financial interest and syndication rules applicable to the networks, and authorizing their
complete sunset in November 1995, unless an FCC review to be completed in 1995
determines that the relaxed rules should be retained, in whole or in part).
, 4. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30
(199,4).
.5.. Id. at 2466 ("The First Amendment's command that government not impede the
freedor of'speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the
free flow of information and ideas.").
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digital subscriber line)-to the jargon. Whether these "fringe" distribution
media will evolve into significant market forces remains to be seen. What
is clear, however, is that regulation will not propel them to market
prominence.
This lack of direction and the resulting sense of frustration is hardly
surprising. The conditions for inertia are clear and prevalent. First, the
government consistently has failed to bring any coherence to the potentially
conflicting policy goals of encouraging marketplace freedoms and
regulating in the "public interest." The sixty-year-old Communications Act
directed the FCC to bring order to a chaotic business through regulation.
Efforts to preserve licensees' status as "public trustees," however, tend to
ring hollow amid an industry that has been urged by deregulation,
constitutional mandate, and economic promise to pursue efficiency and
profit maximization above virtually all else.
Perhaps the latest evidence of this is the Turner Broadcasting decision
itself. Once defended as an essential aspect of the FCC's commitment to
broadcast localism, the cable must-carry rules now are justified as a
response to an economically dysfunctional marketplace. Deregulation has
deprived "localism" of any meaningful content, to the extent that neither
regulators nor jurists can seriously find a substantial government interest to
justify a regulation of expression, such as the must-carry rules. The result
constitutionally elevates broadcasters' balance sheets over the First
Amendment. Should we permit government regulation of speech to save
local broadcast television, if we can find little good to say about it?
Although the Turner Broadcasting decision wraps itself in the appealing
verbiage of "diversity," the opinion seems to acknowledge that there is
nothing very diverse about the broadcast services protected by must-carry.
Although the Fowler FCC argued that the public interest and the profit
interest were identical, the claim remains the target of significant skepti-
cism. Policies of localism and diversity once appeared to have meaning and
purpose; they now have been reduced to empty concepts. Today, their
prime significance is that they may allow a broader range of entrepreneurs
to profit from media ownership and operation. The benefits of these
policies for the "public" are open to substantial debate.
Second, our national communications policymaking apparatus remains
leaderless; economic goals, more than social policies, dictate its future.
Government officials advocate their narrow responsibilities; in the
telecommunications field, agencies' flexibility of action remains subject to
the constraints of the decade-old AT&T antitrust consent decree-the
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Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ).6 The changing tides of international
trade objectives, antitrust enforcement policies, and inconsistent industrial
policies exert more influence on the direction of national communications
policy than almost any other principles. Policymakers view communications
more as a potential engine of economic growth than as a business sector
that is infused with unique constitutional considerations-all because of the
vital economic role that information distribution and processing play in
today's world.
We may move into the next decade without a significant revision of
the Communications Act or the adoption of major new national communi-
cations policies. It may be tempting to sit back and let technology and
economics drive market developments.7 The courts, Congress, the
Commission, and the Department of Justice could intervene intermittently
and narrowly to deal with major developments or politically charged
controversies. After all, we essentially have proceeded this way for years.
Moreover, other countries have adopted the "U.S. model" in regulating
newly privatized communications media.
Before accepting the status quo, however, it may be useful to consider
how to address, more effectively, four important concepts: consolidation,
coordination, competition, and coherence.
Consolidation: There are two critical aspects to this concept. The first
is concentration of control among industry players. There is uncertainty
about whether substantial consolidation will or should occur. There is no
reason to believe, however, that we should have special rules for the media
to encourage or frustrate consolidation. Antitrust principles will change over
time in order to properly address new issues. The MFJ has served a
monumental purpose, but now should be relegated to history, along with
many of the existing statutory and regulatory ownership limits. The market
should be more fluid; existing rules often impose rigidity, thus creating
artificial barriers to assessing reality.
The second aspect of this concept is the consolidation of me-
dia-including the overused buzzword "convergence." The courts' historical
approach to creating rigid distinctions among the media-e.g., "scarcity"
in broadcasting-is obsolete. Electronic media have become increasingly
6. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
7. European and other national and regional policymakers, by contrast, have attempt-
ed-albeit not always successfully-to adopt new, and potentially far-reaching, policies. For
example, despite endless squabbling among its member nations, the European Commission
slowly has begun to develop important new policies in areas such as equipment
standardization, network interconnection, and carriage of "local" content.
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transparent. A television set might show the same program from any one
of several sources: broadcasting, cable, DBS, MMDS, videocassette,
videodisc, or compact disc (CD-ROM or CD-I). If the medium once was
the message, the message is now the message. Accordingly, policies should
not be defined by the characteristics of the distribution technology; they
should be expressed more generally and broadly.
Coordination: The government must make sense of itself, and supply
some policy leadership. Terminating the MFJ (even if its principles are
embodied temporarily in laws) will restore the courts to their traditional and
appropriate role of deciding cases. The government then will have two
remaining challenges: providing leadership at the national level and
fostering more effective federal-state partnerships. The European Union
(EU) has nurtured international cooperation through concepts such as
"subsidiarity" and "harmonization."' Its relative success is significant,
because the EU has no tradition of federalism.
Competition: This is perhaps the most troubled and troublesome
concept. The country undoubtedly has a commitment to competition as a
vehicle to realize desirable objectives. At times, however, there has been
ambivalence about whether competition is a means to an end or an end in
itself. The Communications Act clearly indicates that unbridled competition
is not always the preferred approach. The basic choice of spectrum
licensing, rather than a private spectrum market, reflects a legislative
preference for "managed competition."
One of the major problems with present competition policy, however,
is that government authorities lack information as to market forces. For
example, a merger of a Bell Operating Company and a large cable
company might be desirable, depending upon the answers to some
fundamental questions, such as the following: Are a switched/low capacity
telephone network and an unswitched/high capacity cable system noncom-
petitive? Would a merger create scale economies for the resulting firm? If
the answer to both questions were in the affirmative, presumably the
government would allow the merger; if the answers were negative,
presumably it would not. At present, however, government agencies cannot
reliably assess these issues.
If the government stays with its present competition policy, it must
make rational decisions about how other policies that promote or require
8. "Subsidiarity" refers to the concept of promoting the implementation of EU policies
at the lowest (most decentralized) possible level of government, e.g., at the member-state
level. "Harmonization" refers to the concept of permitting EU member-states to modify EU
directives to suit national conditions, as long as such modifications do not result in a
departure from the basic thrust of the directive.
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competition fit with the basic scheme for distributing spectrum. The FCC's
attempts to "pretend" that there is a vigorously competitive market and to
make choices based on that assumption have created dysfunction and
conflict. If more competition is preferable (for whatever reason), then we
must reevaluate some of the basic principles that have guided the
communications industry for six decades. For example, in a rough and
tumble marketplace, historical perspectives on, and regulatory approaches
toward, "universal service" and the "public interest" will not work; in fact,
concerns about these issues may disappear altogether.
Coherence: Whatever the direction chosen, we will need an under-
standing of the broad impact of our choices. Regulation of cable television
is simply foolhardy, without acknowledging a rule's effect on cable's
competitive market position and the government's supposed policy
commitments to broadband, multimedia networking. Freeing local phone
companies to enter the video distribution business is a dramatic step with
possible cataclysmic effects on the entire market. It is encouraging that
legislators appear attuned to the broader implications of this policy choice,
and are considering widespread changes to provide guidance for future
action.
Coherence should not be equated with equivalence or even-handed-
ness. Coherence demands not a "level playing field," but rather an honest
recognition that seemingly narrow policy choices can have widespread
effects. It requires a real effort to reconcile the effects of differing policies.
We may well find compelling reasons to distinguish among differing
activities and to apply distinct policies to them. At the very least, however,
we should be honest and forthright about the distinctions, and realistic
about the potential constitutional constraints. Again, we need more detailed
data and analysis.
From all indications, we have entered an era of abundance. More
frequencies are being allocated, and spectrum generally is being used more
intensively and efficiently. Distribution facilities are being constructed at
an unparalleled pace; the news of the death of alternative distribution
pipelines is both premature and exaggerated. The emergence of new media
may result in the entry of major new market participants. With less
regulation and more outlets, the opportunity for increasingly diverse content
has grown. Whether the opportunity will be seized, however, remains to be
seen.
Our policies have grown out of scarcity and a fear of market
dominance. In some cases, often inconsistently, we have adopted policies
to address abundance rather than scarcity. Broad reassessment and
reappraisal seem appropriate. The challenge for the next decade will be to
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move from the management of a scarce and powerful resource to the
exploitation of a more abundant and even more powerful one. For the
policymaker, the central task will be trying to allocate-or at least oversee
and channel-the benefits of abundance.
